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Abstract 
 
The ability of law to govern the internet continues to be doubted by many 
activists. Yet there are still calls from many to sanction actors believed to be 
construing the freedom of the internet. One popular call has been for net 
neutrality, aiming to stop Internet Service Providers from customizing traffic for 
different services. But is legal action the only tool we have to regulate a thing?  
Lawrence Lessig’s New Chicago School model enables us to structure a 
problem of regulation by identifying four modalities of regulation that act upon an 
issue. By looking at how law, markets, norms and architecture affect an issue, we 
can gain more insight into the intricacies of regulation.  
In this thesis the author uses the New Chicago School model to analyse and 
structure the problem of net neutrality regulation. The author constructs an 
analytical tool that identifies regulations according to agency or self-execution, 
objectivity or subjectivity, direct or indirect approach, and also how the modalities 
may counteract each other.  
The results show that the model is indeed helpful for structuring problems, and 
that there are many constraints at play, even though there are problems with 
proper operationalization of the model.   
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1 Introduction 
Until recently, many saw the internet as unregulable, that the technology could 
change too rapidly for any legislative body to follow. We are however, moving 
towards a situation where that is no longer the case, and we see both a need and a 
possibility of regulating the internet. One person who argued this point early on 
was Professor Lawrence Lessig. In 1998, he introduced something he called the 
New Chicago School, that dealt with how code regulates behavior in a very 
concrete sense, and that law can regulate code, and vice versa. In his theory, he 
proposed that for all things, there are four forces that regulate its behavior – Law, 
Markets, Norms and Architecture.  
In February 2015 Eric Wheeler, the Chairman of the Federal Communications 
Committee made an important announcement: After a 3-2 vote in the committee, 
the FCC could finally announce a proper net neutrality regulation and that “that 
no one – whether government or corporate – should control free open access to 
the Internet.” (Chappel 2015) 
Net neutrality was conceived by Professor Tim Wu, in a 2003 paper. Since 
then it has been a topic of intense discussion, an extensive amount of research and 
more than a few regulations. It starts with a line of reasoning common among 
techies, that information wants to be free. If information is free, then it also 
enables good things to happen. But if someone tries to make information less free, 
by for example striking deals about interconnectivity between content providers 
and Internet Service Providers, then that it perceived as a threat. So to counter 
this, there has been a popular movement to implement net neutrality as a law. 
In this thesis we will marry these two concepts, the New Chicago School 
theory, and the topic of net neutrality in order to increase our knowledge of how 
things regulate, and how a thing like net neutrality is subject to different kinds of 
regulations at all times. Since our tools for regulating the internet are improving, 
we must gain more knowledge on how that can come about, and to this Lessig 
gives us the possibility to structure our problem in a more comprehensible way. 
1.1 Purpose and research question 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. One purpose is to gain a deeper 
understanding of the forces that govern net neutrality and how regulating the 
internet can be thought of. The other purpose is to see how you can apply the New 
Chicago School theory on a problem to help structure your thoughts and other 
available information on the issue. A part of the first purpose is that many would 
probably say that net neutrality as a concept is clear and the solutions are there to 
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be implemented, but it is relevant to take a step back and examine the issue again 
to see whether all possibilities have been taken into account. A part of the second 
issue is that there is a prevalent idea that the internet naturally is a forum where 
everything is unrestricted but that, again, is something that must be examined to 
see if it holds true.  
Based on this purpose, the question we will ask in the thesis is:  
 How can the issue of net neutrality regulation be understood by using the 
New Chicago School theory? 
1.2 Limitations 
As of writing this text, a Google search for ”net neutrality” OR “network 
neutrality” gets somewhere in the vicinity of 9.5 million hits, and if you search for 
the same words in Google Scholar, where results are limited to academic 
publications, you still end up with over 12 000 different results. While these 
search results may overlap somewhat in theme, opinion and conclusions, it shows 
that net neutrality is a topic that requires certain restrictions in terms of scope, if a 
thesis is to make any sense at all.  
The foremost aim of the thesis is not explaining exactly what net neutrality is, 
what would be a correct approach to regulation on net neutrality, or who is right 
and who is wrong in the debate. It is neither a thesis of law, nor of engineering 
and computer science, meaning that the analysis of legislation and technology in 
this text are vessels to further understand the political science implication of how 
those areas influence the regulation of the network, and net neutrality.  
For each of the constraints there is also a need to define some limitations, and 
these limitations are somewhat entangled with how the constraints are 
conceptualized.  
Law is the constraint where there is the most need to define what to actually 
look at. “Law” looks at where the law constraints a thing by sanctioning certain 
actions regarding that thing. That means that it could be relevant to study the 
legislation in place in different countries, it means that it could be relevant to look 
at court cases defining how certain legislation should be interpreted. It means that 
it could be relevant to look at proposed legislation, both actual thought out 
suggestions and those that have merely been hypothesized. It simply comes down 
to making choices on what I can reasonably study with in a master thesis. So, the 
limitations of the study of law is: I will only look at the US and Sweden, because 
the US is where most discussion on net neutrality takes place, and Sweden acts 
both as a counterpoint where the internet works somewhat differently and it is a 
country where I can immediately find appropriate sources that are relevant and 
readily available. I will describe the current net neutrality situation in the 
countries, and look at a selection of suggestions for how to change the law using 
both academic writing and more opinionated sources.  
Norms might be the constraint where sources are hardest to come by as they 
are somewhat abstract in the New Chicago School model. The norms also enforce 
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sanctions if violated, but not from the state. Instead the community enact them. I 
will therefore look at how opponents and proponents have acted when there has 
been development in the area of net neutrality policy.  
For markets, Lessig’s theory pretty much comes down to a supply and demand 
reasoning, and how prices are set to affect a thing. For this, I will look at how, 
mainly corporate, actors with scarce resources have approached net neutrality, and 
in what way supply and demand work in the area.  
Finally, the limitations on the constraint of architecture. Architecture is limited 
by the scope of what is technologically possible, but also, more acutely, by how 
the technology looks at this very moment. The architectures relevant in this case 
are two things: Code limits how we interpret packages of information, and 
physical cables (or rather the underlying physical infrastructure of the internet) 
limit how many packages information can be delivered at any given time. I will 
try to give an idea of how the physical infrastructure limits net neutrality, and how 
code limits. Due to limited technical ability and prowess, I will not test 
capabilities on my own but will have to use first or second hand sources. I will not 
cover things like the different languages of code, nor hypothesize on future 
technological progress as it is a matter of what is being regulated right now. 
1.3 Disposition 
The thesis is organized in a manner that will hopefully make sure that all 
important ideas are explained at the earliest convenience, and that each 
subsequent part builds on the knowledge acquired in previous chapters. In the 
introduction, I cover the limitations, purpose, disposition and glossary of the core 
concepts of the thesis.  
In chapter two, we introduce the New Chicago School Theory and the concept 
of net neutrality that will form the basis for all the following parts. In chapter 
three we develop the New Chicago School Theory further and present four aspects 
of the four modalities of constraint that will be used in the analysis.  
In chapter four we discuss the methodological choices that goes into using the 
theory for analysis, and of how the sources have been selected. In this chapter we 
also discuss the validity and reliability of the thesis itself.  
In chapter five, we give more detailed input into what net neutrality is and 
how it has been regulated and reported on up to this point by the respective 
regulating authorities in the US and Sweden.  
In chapter six, we analyze how each of the constraints have acted on net 
neutrality and how we can structure their effect.  
Finally, in chapter seven, we present the conclusions and suggestions for 
further research.  
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2 Conceptual background 
Before explaining the methodological choices, and the how to use the theory we 
must establish what sort of thing net neutrality is, and what Lawrence Lessig’s 
theory the New Chicago School deals with. This is therefore a conceptual 
background that is used to understand the choices made in both method and 
theory, but also as a preamble to the analysis. We begin with an introduction to 
the New Chicago School and the core concepts in the theory, which is later 
developed in the theory chapter. After that, we look at the issue of net neutrality, 
explaining the concept and its origin, as well as some related ideas that helps us 
understand later parts of the thesis.  
 
2.1 Introduction to the New Chicago School 
The origin of Lessig’s theory comes, according to himself, from a lecture at a 
conference on “Law of cyberspace” where a prominent speaker, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, declared that there is “no more a “law of cyberspace” than there was 
a ‘Law of the Horse’” (Lessig 1998, p. 501) and that legal academics should stop 
thinking about in what ways the internet differ from other aspects of reality. That 
the judges and lawyers will sort out how to apply the general law on the 
cyberspace, as they have for all other parts of legislation. However, Lessig’s 
reasoning stems from a belief that there really is something particular about the 
law of the cyberspace and that it is worthwhile to think “about how law and 
cyberspace connect”. “[The] point is about the limits on law as a regulator and 
about the techniques for escaping those limits” (Lessig 1998, p. 502). 
When we talk about regulation, we usually refer to the political process of 
changing conditions in society by means of legislation or less strict forms of rules. 
Those are the most tangible ways that we understand regulations, we have a track 
record of the changes made, and we have clear and distinct texts about how they 
apply and who is mandated to uphold such regulations. 
But we are also subject to other regulations, invisible ones, or things you 
rarely even consider as regulations since they are so ingrained in your daily life. 
One way to think about these kinds of regulations, or rather, to think about how 
something is affected by different types of regulations, was presented by 
Lawrence Lessig in the late 1990’s. In the article “The New Chicago School” 
(1998) he launched the theory, and with the article “The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach” (1999b) and the book Code: and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace (1999a) he established it in wider circles. The book was later updated 
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in 2006 in collaboration with readers and experts via a wiki-format to become 
Code: version 2.0 which we will come back to.  
The theory is, jokingly, named by Lessig as “the New Chicago School” 
(Lessig 2006, p. 340), but is also referred as the Pathetic Dot theory, after the 
example by which Lessig introduces the concept. It is the theory that will form the 
framework of this thesis. 
In broad terms Lessig says that a thing, in his given example the thing is a 
pathetic dot, is regulated by four different constraints: Laws, Markets, Norms and 
Architecture. These constraints act on the pathetic dot by sanctions, be it legal or 
social, and by barriers to action, be it price or walls, and act both accumulatively 
and in divergence. They form the space in which we may determine not only 
which regulation in law is best suitable or most effective, but even more so how 
legislation interacts with other forms of regulation. We may also see whether 
constraints may or may not affect a thing, in ways we do not see at first glance. 
The thought where the theory started can be put in the same category as a 
famous line from Swedish entrepreneur Jan Stenbeck: “Technology beats politics” 
(Andersson 2000, p.16). Meaning, the politics and legislation is thought to have a 
limited reach as a regulator for the technological innovations and malleability of 
coders and entrepreneurs to come up with new work-arounds. However, Lessig 
says that legislators instead have to figure out what tools to use when they want to 
regulate a thing. Traditional law, “an order backed by a threat directed at primary 
behavior” (Lessig 1999b, p. 502), does not cover the capabilities which legislators 
might need to regulate cyberspace.  
In the fourth installment of the theory, Code 2.0, Lessig revises some of the 
original premises of the theory from 1998: What he rallied against then was a 
view that the net was impossible to regulate, that it was and always would be free 
from snooping eyes and control by governments and corporations. That it was a 
regulatory safe haven. While the opposition to such statements was slightly 
radical in 1998, by 2006 Lessig says that, in reference to many believing he was 
mistaken in arguing as such, “I am more confident than I was then, and thus I 
have chosen to stick with this “fundamental mistake”. Perhaps this is simply to 
hedge my bets: If I’m right, then I have the reward of understanding. If I’m 
wrong, then we’ll have an Internet that is closer to the values of its original 
design.” (Lessig, 2006, p. X). 
It is also important to note that the theory does not give us a manual for how to 
create or even analyze regulations, it does not give us answers, but rather it offers 
a way to structure a problem. An insight that can be used and applied elsewhere 
later.  
2.1.1 Constraints, or modalities of regulation 
The ideas Lessig present in “The New Chicago School” (1998) are not just 
applicable to cyber law, although most examples are framed in that context. It can 
be applied to other fields was well, even outside of legislation as such. There are 
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many things which are regulated by other constraints than legislation, and those 
where it is uncertain which one is actually the governing constraint. 
The constraints are, as mentioned previously: Law, Markets, Norms and 
Architecture. Lessig calls the constraints “regulators” and they each act as “a 
distinct modality of regulation” (Lessig 2006, p. 124). Of the four, the law is the 
most commonly thought of regulator, or modality of regulation. It is also the one 
most readily available for influencing the other modalities. The different 
constraints are not working in a vacuum, they are not independent of each other. 
Instead, they are interacting in a lot of different ways, giving the possibility to 
regulate directly or indirectly, and to adjust to the circumstances. This will be 
dealt with further on in the text. 
The thing they regulate can vary. It can be a pathetic dot as in the first 
example given, or they could be regulating behavior of some sort, be it car thefts 
or file sharing. It can also regulate immaterial things, such as traffic mortality 
rates. In most cases, there is an ideal behind the regulation, as we usually do not 
regulate for the sake of regulating. Changing the seatbelt legislation has nothing to 
do with fashion or wanting to enforce a nuisance, but rather an effort to reduce 
traffic mortality rates.  
In this section we will look at a few different examples on how the different 
constraints act or could act on different things, to get an introduction. In chapter 3 
we will look at how the constraints interact, if they regulate post or ex ante, and 
how they may interact or counteract. And of course how we will use the theory as 
an analytical tool.  
2.1.2 Law 
“Law is a command backed up by the threat of sanction. [...] the picture of law is fairly 
simple and straight-forward: Don’t do this, or else.” (Lessig 2006, p. 340).  
In what way does law regulate things? The theory is pretty straight forward: There 
is a rule mandated by law, and if the rule is not followed, you will pay the 
consequences. If you surpass the speed limit, you will get fined or your license 
may get revoked. If you drive recklessly and hit someone you might have to serve 
jail time. We have laws against downloading copyrighted material without 
permission, and we have laws that stipulate that you have to pay certain taxes for 
some forms of consumption, and other taxes for other things. We have laws that 
criminalizes fraud, or theft, or use of certain drugs.  In all cases, where there is a 
law, there is usually a sanction that follows that law. In that way, laws regulate 
things in very tangible ways. (Lessig 2006, p. 124) 
2.1.3 Norms  
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“By social norms, I mean those normative constraints imposed not through the organized 
or centralized actions of a state, but through the many slight and sometimes forceful 
sanctions that members of a community impose on each other.” (Lessig 2006, p. 340) 
 
Norms also regulate through sanctions. We try to say thank you after a nice dinner 
and if you do not you might not get invited back, we speak at a reasonable volume 
when we meet someone or else they might never talk to you again, we say that 
newborn babies are cute if the parents are showing us pictures to avoid the angry 
stares from hurt parents and so on. Prejudice is another regulating norm, making it 
harder for people with different sounding names to get jobs or more likely that 
they get randomly searched at an airport security station. While not as severe as 
regulation by law, norms impact our choices in everyday life and is often 
engrained in the patterns that we express in our behavior and actions. (Lessig 
2006, p. 125) 
2.1.4 Markets 
“The market constraints through price. A price signals the point at which a resource can be 
transferred from one person to another.” (Lessig 2006, p. 341)  
Markets also act on things. The price of gas affects how many people buy hybrid 
cars, the price of cornflakes affect how many people are likely to buy Coco Pops, 
and the price of an apartment will affect where you choose to live. Markets do not 
sanction behavior, but rather regulates choices directly when that choice is being 
made. That means that when your desire is to buy, say, a new bike, price will 
regulate your choice as soon as you see the price tag. It will determine the 
opportunity cost of your finite resources. To some extent, it is also parasitic on 
law, meaning that it requires things like property law and other rules of 
engagement to function (Lessig 1998, p. 663).  
2.1.5 Architecture  
“[T]he constraint of architecture - the way the world is, or the ways specific aspects of it 
are. Architects call it the built environment; those who don’t give out names just recognize 
it as the world around them.” (Lessig 2006, p. 341) 
 
Finally, architecture. An example from Lessig will have to highlight how much 
architecture can regulate without people considering it in the first place: “Robert 
Moses built bridges on Long Island to block buses, so that African Americans, 
who depended primarily on public transportation, could not easily get to public 
beaches” (Lessig 1999, p. 92). A similar example that Lessig talks about is the 
aftermath of Shelley v Kraemer when the practice of putting provisions in sales 
contracts that the buyer of a house had to be of a certain race was struck down in 
the US, local communities instead started building small but important divides 
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between communities. Highways without crossings, railways through cities and 
“[a] thousand tiny inconveniences of architecture” (Lessig 1999, p. 97) affected 
integration by use of nothing more than architecture. (Ibid.). Unlike the sanctions 
of laws and norms, architecture always regulates. A door is locked whether or not 
you wish to go through it.  
We will add more complexity to these concepts in chapter three, but this is 
what we need to have in mind when learning about net neutrality. 
 
2.2 Introduction to Net Neutrality 
What is net neutrality? How long has the debate been going on and what has 
happened so far? In this section we will introduce the concept of net neutrality and 
a few related concept. 
This section starts off with the origin of the concept and then an introduction 
to the net neutrality debates with the aim of making the discussion as 
understandable as possible, since an adequate comprehension of the underlying 
concept is needed to understand the analysis in later sections. We then continue 
with a section on technology neutrality to get an idea of how technology and 
politics can relate, and whether artifacts, such as looms or iPads, can have or 
require certain political implications or systems.  
2.2.1 Net neutrality 
There are a number of different definitions of what net neutrality is and what it 
ought to be. Therefore, this thesis will not try to define net neutrality as such, but 
rather give an explanation to what kind of questions it deals with and what kind of 
different perspectives there may be in the discussion on the topic.  
First of all, what is the deal with net? What kind of thing is it that we actually 
think should be neutral? What is implied by “net” is the internet itself? The 
content, the infrastructure, the routers and switches, the cables and the people on 
it? It is the cables that transport packages of information and the routers, the 
servers that store information and switches that redistribute information to where 
it is going. Because the internet contains so many parts, it further complicates the 
definition of “net neutrality”. Sometimes you will see “network neutrality” used 
instead of net neutrality. The concepts are almost always completely 
interchangeable.  
Tim Wu, a professor of law at Columbia University and previously at Virginia 
Law School, is widely recognized for creating and popularizing the concept of 
network neutrality in a 2003 paper called “Network Neutrality, Broadband 
Discrimination” in the Journal of Telecommunications & High Technology Law. 
The article started with what is now an impressive observation and prediction: 
“Communications regulators over the next decade will spend increasing time on 
  9 
conflicts between the private interests of broadband providers and the public’s 
interest in a competitive innovation environment centered on the Internet.” (Wu 
2003, p. 141). 
After the introduction of the concept, it has been a topic of widespread debate, 
in regulatory instances as well as in media and on academic sites. As of the 
writing of this text, the search term ““net neutrality” OR “network neutrality”” 
gets 12 000 search results on Google Scholar, and 9.5 million search results on 
Google. It is far too many results to even glimpse all perspectives on the debate, 
but I can at least introduce some of the main points that have been made. 
2.2.2 A brief introduction to how the internet works 
 
In the very basic description of the internet, one can say that it is a series of tubes 
that connect and distribute information between computers and servers. With that 
very simple arrangement, you can communicate with contacts on the other side of 
the globe, you can watch the latest cat video and you can keep constant track on 
what is going on in the world. You can also develop new ways to decode the 
information sent, develop new forms of content and services that are accessible 
through the internet. You can gain access to information that was intended to be 
inaccessible through various methods, and distribute malevolent and nefarious 
pieces of information that destroy, hinder or corrupt information in other places.  
Depending on who you ask about what the internet is, you might get very 
different answers. Staffan Jonson, policy advisor at the Internet Foundation in 
Sweden, writes that if you ask an engineer, you might get the answer that the 
internet is made up of seven layers of electronic communications according to the 
OSI model, the Open Systems Interconnection Model which we will look at 
briefly later. A politician would say that it is an innovation and an opportunity for 
economic growth in a society, or something that can make health care more 
efficient or something different to the same effect. An entrepreneur would say the 
internet creates an arena for new services to be developed (Jonson 2010, p. 13).  
The examples highlight that there are deep technological perspectives of the 
internet, political ones, and business perspectives as well. In the end, all these 
perspectives are a product of the ability of computers, connected in a vast network 
of cables and tubes, to send, interpret and display information that has traveled in 
the form of 1’s and 0’s.  
2.2.3 Net neutrality issues 
Wu wrote this original article to broaden and update a discussion on “open 
access”, which was the previous iteration of net neutrality, where it was suggested 
that broadband operators ought not to deliver services on the internet, so as to split 
delivery of internet access from delivery of services on the internet. Wu suggested 
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ways in which one could try to regulate internet operators to handle the “likely 
recurrence of these kinds of questions” (Wu 2003, p. 142).  
The proponents of net neutrality have been calling on the regulation of internet 
operators in order to, at least in general terms, keep the internet open, claiming 
that an internet without net neutrality would lead to those who have resources 
buying prime access to an internet fast lane, leaving normal consumers in a slow 
lane. Another version of the same story is that an internet without net neutrality 
would lead to a “cable-TV-internet” where consumers will have to go through the 
internet operators, who could act as gatekeepers, to access desirable and high 
quality content.  
The opponents of net neutrality, we will get back to who those are in chapter 
6, generally argue that if net neutrality was to be instituted, it would mean that 
internet operators cannot develop better products that would help consumers to a 
greater extent than today. They say that a non-neutral net would increase the 
innovations on internet traffic to create a more versatile online experience. While 
both of these perspectives hold some legitimacy, they are also flawed in a number 
of ways, and we will cover more of that in the analysis.  
There has also been a number of examples of where operators have, at least 
according to some, abused their position and furthered calls for instituting net 
neutrality. The one above, popularized by John Oliver on the show Last Week 
Tonight, is a graph showing the capacity increase on Netflix services from 
different US internet operators. It is shows a segment of time during which Netflix 
was negotiating with Comcast, one of the major internet operators in the US, 
about an interconnectivity deal (where content providers pay broadband providers 
to get an improved delivery by integrating their delivery with the providers 
networks). The graph shows that during the time that the negotiations are said to 
have been going on, the delivery speed for Netflix showed a drastic drop, 
specifically on Comcast. When the deal was struck, the speed again shot up. It 
could be hypothesized that Comcast abused their position in order to force Netflix 
Image 1: Ehrenfreund 2014.  
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into a deal, and this was also the story that the Washington Post covered. (Gustin 
2014)  
An updated graph taken from Netflix own reporting on ISP speed shows that 
in August of 2014, more interconnectivity deals were struck, leading to a further 
increase in speeds, after a time of decrease. 
 
  
  
 
Another example of a possible abuse of the principles of net neutrality is when 
Swedish ISP Telia blocked access to Skype in 2012, as they considered Skype to 
be a competitor to their telephone services, while operating on the internet 
spectrum instead. They said in their annual report that: 
“Changed customer behavior which leads to a mix shift in our business highlights the need 
to develop our business models and how we charge for our services going forward. We 
have been in the forefront stating that while prices for voice will continue to come down 
there must be a stronger correlation between usage and pricing of data.” (TeliaSonera 
2012) 
While the reasoning may be understandable from a pure business perspective, 
and it created an uproar in both media and from the public. Telia has since 
withdrawn from this policy, after only a few months, stating among other things 
that it turned out to be too complicated. (Zirn 2012) 
They did, however, also increased their costs for mobile broadband when they 
stepped away from the VoIP-policy, in line with the quote above. (Fingas 2012) 
After this brief introduction to the debate, we will look at how the New 
Chicago School Theory may be used, and what the methodological choices and 
problems are with the thesis. 
 
Image 2: Netflix 1. 
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3 Theory 
In the previous chapter we learned that there are four different constraints within 
the New Chicago School, a bit about their origin and looked at examples on how 
they regulate. In this section we will develop the theory and describe a theoretical 
tool that can be used for the analysis of net neutrality later. As mentioned 
previously, it is important to note that Lessig’s theory is not constructed as a way 
to find definitive answers about how to regulate, or even how regulation happened 
in the first place, but rather a way to organize a problem into its constituent parts. 
It can help you structure your thoughts about an issue, which may help you solve 
it, but is not the solution itself.  
We will look at four different aspects of constraints and regulation. The first 
two helps us specify how a regulation works. The agency regulation helps us by 
looking at how a constraint is executed. Objective versus subjective regulation 
helps us by looking at how a regulation works for the person taking an action, for 
someone observing the action and how it regulates in time. The next aspect looks 
at what type of regulation we should choose in a given situation and whether we 
want to regulate directly or indirectly. And fourthly we will look at how 
constraints may counteract each other, creating negative spirals of regulation 
rather than positive ones.   
Finally, we will summarize how these aspects can form an analytical tool that 
can be used when looking at net neutrality.  
3.1 Regulatory agency 
 
The first categorization of the theory is how the regulations are executed. In the 
background we mentioned that law and norms sanction certain behavior after a 
violation of a rule, be it legal or social, has occurred. Law sanctions through the 
power of the state, with legislations that governing bodies have implemented on 
the society. That legislation is in some form the norms that we, through our 
elected representatives, want to enforce on society (Lessig 2006 p 340). 
Therefore, law does not constrain in the same way in all countries, we have 
different laws. Norms are enforced by the sanctions of the community when an 
action oversteps what is considered “socially salient behavior” (Ibid). Law and 
Norm therefor regulate in very similar ways, and the only difference is who 
enforces the sanctions on the person, the state or the community.  
Markets, however, regulate somewhat differently. As previously mentioned, 
markets regulate through the price mechanism. Prices are a transaction cost, how 
  13 
much will I have to give you to get the thing I want. They are also an opportunity 
cost, meaning that with finite resources every choice you make, you will not make 
another choice, and prices regulate which alternative is most attractive. The point 
is that prices do not regulate after the transaction takes place, or even after the 
choice is made. Price regulates at the exact same time that you make a choice. 
(Lessig 2006 p 341)  
These three regulation are in some way built on whether or not an action takes 
place, if there is some form of agency. If there is no desire or will, no regulation 
takes place. That is not the case for architecture.   
Architecture, or nature, regulates irrespective of the choices or will of the 
regulated behavior. We cannot travel faster than the speed of light. Unless you 
have to power to change the architecture, your actions are always constrained by 
the built world around you. It does not have to stand in your way, it is just there. 
Lessig calls this the “self-execution” (Lessig 2006 p 342) of architecture, and it is 
part of what makes it a fundamentally different thing in regulation, and why it is 
interesting to look at the Law of the Horse. He says that if we are aware if this 
distinction, we might not need to always rely on “continued agency, loyalty, or 
reliability of individuals” (Ibid) but can instead construct systems where 
resistance, slowness, partition of power or whatever else, is built into the system. 
This goes for political as well as mechanical or digital systems. (Lessig 2006 p 
341f)   
3.2 Regulating objectively or subjectively 
Another distinction made within the theory is whether a regulation acts 
objectively or subjectively. The distinction between “someone observing when a 
constraint is imposed […] and the person who experiences the constraint” (Lessig 
2006 p 343). The previous definitions have mostly been about whether a 
regulation constrains objectively. 
In the case of the execution of sanctions, law and norms are objectively an ex 
post regulation, meaning they regulate after the fact. Markets and architecture are 
objectively ex ante regulations, they regulate before an action is made. But if you 
add a subjective perspective on regulation, a lot of the differences between the 
regulations disappear.  
While law is most often an ex post regulation, we are also aware of what the 
law actually says, and therefore we do not test the limits of the law at every 
opportunity. We do not hit random passersby in the face, because it goes against 
both our norms and our laws, and we do this without testing the limit every time. 
In the same way, after having been burned by nettles or poison ivy as kids, we 
usually try to avoid them, creating a subjective constraint based on a real life 
architectural constraint. (Lessig 2006 p 343) 
Constraints, therefore, work both subjectively and objectively. While the 
objective constraint is easy to describe and take into consideration, it might not be 
as easy to predict if a regulation will have a subjective response as well. Choosing 
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what regulation to use is just as important as knowing how a specific regulation 
works, and this is the topic of the next subsection.  
3.3 Regulating directly and indirectly 
Lessig introduces this level of the theory with an example: Imagine being a 
society that has a problem with theft of car stereos. “[Not] big in the scale of 
things, but a frequent and costly enough problem to make more regulation 
necessary” (Lessig 2006 p 125). If you want to quell this surge of thefts, you can 
choose law as the constraint. Stealing is already illegal, but obviously that is not 
enough of a threshold to avoid the risk of getting caught. So one thing you can do 
is to increase the risk threshold by drastically raising the punishment for theft of 
car stereos to life in prison. (Lessig 2006 p 125f) 
Another way to go about it is changing the architecture of the car radio so that 
it becomes impossible to play in any other car than the one it was stolen from (by 
means of codes that in one way or another ties the radio to a specific car), making 
the value of a second hand car stereo plummet. Both alternatives will have the 
same outcome on the dot (theft of car radios), but social norms will make the legal 
option less desirable as most societies would frown on a lifetime in prison for an 
offence as small as stealing a car radio. We therefore have a situation where the 
constraints make some options plausible (architecture) and others implausible 
(law) even if their predicted outcome would have been pretty much the same, at 
least from the perspective of the pathetic dot. This dynamic interaction “[requires] 
consideration of not only… legal adjustments, but also predicting the responsive 
effects such changes will stimulate” (Polk Wagner in Lessig 2006 p 130). 
There is also the situation where you choose to use one constraint to indirectly 
change the dot by directly changing one of the other constraints. A concrete 
example of this is regulation on seatbelts where car manufacturers had to start 
adding seat belts to all cars to decrease the danger of automotive transportation 
and car crashes. The thing we wish to regulate was the loss of lives in traffic 
related incidents, and we did it by legally mandating architecture to adapt. 
These ways of using the constraints are called direct and indirect regulation. In 
what way do we best serve the goal we want to achieve? Is it through directly 
forbidding something, or is it by regulating certain architectural features that in 
itself regulate a certain behavior? Can we hope for norms to change on their own, 
like with gender equality questions, or should law regulate certain power 
structures so that the norms are also forced to change? Can free markets help you 
charge your phone all over the globe, or can you use architectural nudges to 
prevent technological integration (different power sockets on computers and 
phones) or ease of use (regulation to make phone manufacturers use the same 
receptacles for charging)?  
Law is probably the constraint that is easiest to see how it can affect other 
constraints as it is also the constraint normally associated with political regulation. 
Indeed, Lessig uses the indirect regulation of law as the standard for indirect 
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regulation, saying: “The law chooses between direct and indirect regulation” 
(Lessig 2006, 129). We can use laws to change how architecture regulates traffic 
safety by implementing a law that makes car manufacturer's install seat belts, or 
that the crumple zones must absorb a certain amount of energy from an impact. 
We can use laws to change how norms regulate traffic safety by introducing 
obligatory traffic safety classes in the school curricula. We can use laws to change 
how markets regulate the availability of more environmentally friendly cars, like 
with the electric car subsidies in Norway that has made Norway the second 
biggest market for a company like Tesla. (Reuters 2015)  
As a thought experiment, it is possible to see how the other constraints may be 
used to indirectly affect each other. The internet is one of the places where 
architecture has an impact on what can and is being regulated. Of course 
legislators could decide to completely ignore the code of the internet, just as well 
as they can ignore the way buildings are being built to implement new rules, but 
usually, they will have to limit their available political solutions to what form the 
legal area has. Social norms can be used to gradually change the interpretation of 
the law, especially in political systems where the courts have more power. One 
such example is the recent advances for marriage equality in the United States 
where the law has not undergone a huge change, but social pressure has made 
certain interpretations less frequent, eventually toppling the highest legal 
authority. And Markets, although it is very difficult to pinpoint a certain internal 
logic and consciousness of “markets”, make architectures of certain political 
systems impossible. For example, history has shown that trying to centrally plan 
production is nearly impossible as market functions such as demand for certain 
goods work against central planning, the market disrupts the implementation of 
certain architectures. 
These later examples are not fool proof, and are to be considered food for 
thought for the upcoming chapters. When we discuss indirect regulation, it will be 
mostly from the perspective of what the law should regulate. In the next section 
we will look at when the constraints counteract each other and may create 
negative feedback loops. One of the inherent problems with indirect regulation is 
that it may be hard to see what effect an indirect regulation might have, especially 
with strong constraints already working on an issue. (Lessig 2006 p 132ff) 
3.4 Regulations contradicting each other 
 It is not only positive reinforcement of other constraints that is the limit to the 
interaction between constraints. They also clash, or at least work in opposition to 
each other, creating either a contradictory situation or even negative feedback 
loops where one regulation acts negatively on another, and that in turn enforces 
the first regulation. This is not something that Lessig explicitly mentions in his 
works on the matter, but it is a logical consequence of is theories and how they 
apply to the real world.   
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Even if the law prohibits file sharing of copyrighted material without 
permission, a majority of the younger generations not only file share, they 
perceive file sharing as just. The norm for file sharing copyrighted material goes 
directly against the law’s intent to quell precisely that kind of behavior (Svensson 
& Larsson 2009, p 59). One of the enablers of this contradiction is the architecture 
of the internet, which does not care about what information you send, thereby 
allowing criminal activities as well as legal ones.  
Markets may also contradict the law. Take the example of drug use, which is 
generally prohibited in a majority of the countries in the world, yet for example in 
the United States, before marijuana was decriminalized in certain states 38% 
indicated that they had tried the then illegal substance (Saad 2013). Despite the 
intent of the law and, to a certain extent, the norms, markets still make marijuana 
and other illegal drugs available to consumers.  
Another negative feedback loop is mentioned in the books, namely the case of 
Shelley v Kraemer that was mentioned previously. The case involved a practice 
where deeds on property could be written to exclude people of certain races from 
purchasing the property. This was a practice of segregation and a racist norm. 
Before this practice was banned, about “25 percent of properties in South Chicago 
had been prohibited from sale to African Americans” (Lessig 2009, p. 134). 
However, just because the law had changed, norms did not. So communities 
began, according to Lessig, segregating by other means. And one regulation they 
chose was architecture. By use of highways without easy crossing, railroad tracks 
and other inconveniences, architecture was used to make it harder for 
communities to intermingle. (Lessig 2006, p. 134f)  
That is where Lessig’s example stops, as a case for how indirect regulation 
may fail. However, I see it as an example where constraints create negative 
feedback loops. Because the communities now separated will continue to separate 
even more, and the structural racism existing in the norms of society will become 
further entrenched, creating even larger differences between the groups on a 
number of different factors.  
At least for certain parties, the clash in the net neutrality framework is 
between an architecture that has one specific purpose, that promotes one type of 
behavior, and a market that wants to change the architecture to fit another 
purpose. It is therefore important to consider such clashes when describing the 
theoretical framework.  
 
3.5 How to use the New Chicago School as a 
theoretic framework? 
“We are entering a time when our power to muck about with the structures that regulate is 
at an all-time high. It is imperative, then, that we understand just what to do with this 
power. And, more importantly, what not to do with it.” (Lessig 2006, p. 345) 
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Previously, I said that the New Chicago School offers a way to structure problems 
of regulation in a way that makes it possible to use that structure in other 
circumstances. It is not a way to get full answers and final solutions, but then 
again, how often do you really get those anyway? In the sections above we have 
looked at a few different ways to look at problems of regulation, and how to 
classify different actions and regulations. In this part, we will outline how this 
may be used in the analysis of net neutrality in later sections.  
So far we have established that there are four distinct modalities of regulation: 
Law, Norms, Markets and Architecture. Laws regulate through sanctions enforced 
by the government. Norms regulate though sanctions enforced by the community. 
Markets regulate through price. Architecture regulates through barriers in the real 
and constructed world.  
We have established that these modalities of regulation are executed 
differently, where some constraints regulate only when an action is taken, while 
others regulate all the time, irrespective of agency. We have established that the 
modalities of regulation have different temporal perspectives, where they can be 
categorized on whether they regulate before or after the fact, or if they regulate 
subjectively or objectively. 
We have also established that regulations can be made direct, or indirect and 
that it is important to consider what form of regulation to use to get a desired 
effect. Finally, we have established that regulations may counteract each other and 
create negative feedback loops.  
With these forms of categories and perspectives we can organize and structure 
the problem of net neutrality regulation in order to gain knowledge of what factors 
may affect it, and thereby gaining more knowledge on what it really is.  
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4 Methods 
In this section I will develop and describe the methodological choices of this 
thesis. It begins with a classification of what type of study it is in relation to the 
research question, and then I will move on to consider the difficulties that has to 
be taken into consideration before and during the work. According to Essiasson et 
al. (2009) a large part of the design process is picking the cases to study 
(Essiasson et al. 2009, p. 99). In this thesis the cases studied are aspects of net 
neutrality as they relate to the New Chicago School theory.  
Other basic choices that have been made is narrowing down the cases to USA 
and Sweden. This choice is made because of their respective peculiarities in the 
question. USA because it has been the center for most of the debate, and a few 
different variations on regulation. And Sweden because it was a nation that 
quickly built up their IT-infrastructure with a lot of state incentives, making the 
market look very different from the US. And these countries are also relevant 
because I am able to read sources from both without any third party translations.  
4.1 How the theory is used 
The main idea of the thesis is to analyze how the New Chicago School Theory can 
be applied to the issue of net neutrality. According to Essiasson et al. there are 
three main ways of making an investigation, from the perspective of the empirical 
material. These are theory testing, theory consuming and theory developing 
studies (Essiasson et al. 2009, p. 99). In a way, I have done a version of each of 
the types. Testing and consuming are classified as research where there is an 
established theory, but where testing has the theory in the center and consuming 
has empirical evidence at the center. Theory developing research does not have a 
theory in place before the evidence is collected. In this case, Lessig has created a 
theory, and we are using that theory to understand the net neutrality issue. But we 
also have an explicit goal of understanding net neutrality better. And finally, since 
Lessig has not designed an analytical tool, that part of the theory has to be 
developed.  
 
 
4.2 Qualitative and clarifying Study  
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As for the analysis itself, it is almost purely a qualitative textual analysis. This is 
first and foremost a consequence the theory the thesis aims to look at. The New 
Chicago School theory tried to find the specific instances where a thing is 
regulated by one of the four constraints. Neither of these constraints have a 
quantitative perspective in Lessig’s writing, and while it would not be possible, it 
would be a stretch to fit them into a quantitative framework.  
The qualitative study means that I will look at selection of sources that will 
serve as representatives of the ideas presented there, and as such will give us an 
insight into how the constraints have acted on net neutrality. (Essiassion et al. 
2009, p. 238) 
When the sources have been identified, we must also do an analysis. Since we 
are interested in finding representative sources that help us decide how different 
constraints act on a certain debate, we will have to identify two things from our 
sources. The first is what relation it has to net neutrality. This can be tricky as 
something may regulate net neutrality without anyone actually mentioning the 
words net neutrality when talking about it. We therefore need to have a clear idea 
of what net neutrality actually is, and from there derive what might be relevant to 
study in each category. 
When that understanding is established, we can also make more informed 
choices of what sources and perspectives may be relevant to study further.   
 
4.3 Validity and reliability 
 
There are two big problems with dealing with the validity and reliability of this 
study and the analysis of such a vast debate. The first problem arises from the lack 
of previous research on this particular field of study. And the second problem 
arises from the vast amount of documents available for the qualitative study. Both 
these points relate to point one and three of in the definition of what constitutes 
the validity: Correspondence between theoretical definitions and operational 
indicators, and that we measure what we say that we measure (Esiasson et al. 
2009, p. 64). These are also cases of validity of concept, and validity of results.  
There is a lot of research on net neutrality, and there is some research that has 
used Lessig’s New Chicago School theory, but very little research that exists in 
the cross section of these two groups. Therefore, there are no established 
categories of analysis that can help determine what to look for, since Lessig’s 
theory is builds on some thematic examples, like smoking, to establish the 
connections between the modalities and then about random examples to 
strengthen the argumentation. In the first iteration of the theory, from 1998, 
Lessig says that the outline of the theory is “of necessity a sketch, and its main 
objective is simply to mark place where methodological work still needs to be 
done” (Lessig 1998 p 661). This does not change much in later iterations. 
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As for the analysis of each of the constraints (Law, Market, Norms and 
Architecture), there are further problems. After having determined what to look 
for in each category, there is an enormous amount of sources to look for. Law is 
probably the area with the most amount of research, as the academic debates in 
the US on the issue tend to be within the frame of legal regulation, together with 
some analysis of economic effects. With architecture, the subject of study is so 
intimately intertwined with net neutrality that it might be hard to pinpoint where 
regulation actually happens. With Markets, Lessig says that the only type of 
regulation is price. However, markets are usually more complex than price, and 
price itself does not need to be a result of a simple demand and supply equation, 
but instead has much more underlying information than at first glance. And 
finally, for norms, it is hard to determine what norms exist within a population 
and how these norms then act to sanction the thing at hand. For Lessig, these 
modalities of regulation are explained with examples that can be fairly easily 
identified, but when applying it to a specific subject that is not explicitly studied 
by Lessig, it becomes harder to find sources and adequate information. 
4.4 Sources 
As previously mentioned, there is an abundance of resources to look at the 
question on net neutrality in particular. And therefore, there is an abundance of 
sources that is theoretically plausible to consider in the analysis and background, 
so some selection is in order.  
Based on the theory, we can conclude that the sources that we need to study 
can come from a few different types of material. The chosen sources are 
representative in respect to the theories presented in the previous chapter and 
based on that limitation, certain selections are natural and strategic to make. They 
are also chosen because they represent recent developments in the field. 
(Essiasson et al. 2009, p. 180) 
For law, the main source of materials is from different government 
organizations, mainly the PTS and the FCC. This is because these are the main 
regulating bodies on the issue of net neutrality in their respective domains. 
Another source that could have been plausible to use would be academic literature 
from legal scholars, however, since I am not a lawyer and this is a thesis in 
political science, and because of the frequency of opinionated input in the field, 
the government agencies are a more relevant and concrete source to study.   
For norms, I have based my research on stories from news. Since sanctions by 
norms are enforced by the community, and most members of a community would 
be able to readily identify what norms they act on and how, I will have to interpret 
what norms have been at play in noteworthy instances of news. There is also very 
little academic research on the normative aspects of net neutrality.  
For markets, I have based my research partly on stories from news, but also 
from statements from the companies themselves to be able to get an idea of their 
own motivation for taking certain actions. One possible source for seeing the price 
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mechanism at work would be to try to find historical prices for data traffic and 
other related indicators and then correlate them to quality of service. But since 
those datasets are both hard to come by, and require an effort unreasonable for a 
master thesis, that is not a viable option.  
For architecture I have based my research on academic books describing the 
internet in different ways. As I am not a programmer or engineer myself, I will 
have to derive information from their expertise instead.  
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5 Depictions of Net Neutrality 
In this section, we will go through some of the sources and documents that 
will form the basis for our analysis. These consist of statements, reports and 
regulations from the regulators in Sweden and the US, as well as academic and 
other contributions to the public debate on net neutrality. They give an insight into 
how regulators and others perceive the issues, and are a good source for how the 
current systems are actually constructed. As such, they are key to being able to 
analyze the constraints later.  
We have two comprehensive text from the Swedish regulator Post- och 
Telestyrelsen, or the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, which is the regulator 
on all things relating to internet and telecommunications infrastructure in Sweden. 
The first is a short report on net neutrality from 2009, the second is a larger report 
called the Openness Report, also from 2009, which gives a comprehensive 
analysis on how the entire value chain of the internet works in Sweden. 
After the PTS perspective, we will look at how the FCC, the Federal 
Communications Committee, have defined net neutrality in the past (2005 and 
2010) as well as looking at the 2015 regulation. Why does a master thesis from 
Sweden look at the American regulations? Mainly because the United States is 
where a lot of the discussion on net neutrality takes place, and what happens to the 
internet in the US has, at least until recently, had a lot of impact to the internet in 
the rest of the world.  
5.1 Perspectives from PTS 
PTS, Post- och Telestyrelsen, is the regulator of internet governance in Sweden. 
In that role they have produced a number of different reports that analyze the net 
neutrality and internet governance situations in Sweden.  
5.1.1 The net neutrality report  
In a 2009 report called Nätneutralitet (eng. Net Neutrality) PTS try to define the 
concept in a way. They do acknowledge that there is no legal or common 
definition of net neutrality. A reason for this, according to PTS, is that there are 
several different interest groups that use the concept in different ways (PTS-ER-
2009:6). They do try to form a definition for two different categories, namely 
users and internet service providers.  
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“Users should, within the framework of a certain internet access 
service, be able to: 
 Freely receive and send content, 
 Freely use content services and software that does not hurt the 
network. 
 Internet service providers should, within the framework of the same 
internet access service,: 
 Not manipulate or deprioritize data traffic for a user based on content, 
source or destination.  
 Give clear information in marketing and terms of conditions regarding 
the capacity and quality of the connection. “ (PTS-ER-2009:6, p. 9, my 
translation)  
 
What we get here is two slightly different approaches to net neutrality from 
the get go. Firstly, within the net neutrality concept, users should receive a certain 
service and that service should not be hindered by anything except for harmful 
use. Secondly, within the net neutrality concept, Internet service providers need to 
provide a certain service and that service has to be unmanipulated. The internet 
service provider also needs to give clear information regarding the service. So the 
two distinct parts of this definition of net neutrality is the receiver and the 
provider of information services. The burden in the scenario is on the service 
providers that would have fewer ways to compete in a PTS defined net neutral 
market.  
PTS also try to define what net neutrality is not, since it might help clarifying 
what they mean in the definition above. They have three main concepts: 
 
a. It is not “open net”, meaning it does not apply to the situation where a 
single neutral actor supplies the infrastructure and the end users choose 
network operators that compete with supplying internet access and other 
services. This is a common system in Sweden where either 
municipalities or corporations own the wires and ISPs compete on an 
equal basis for the users.  
 
b. It is not about a right to internet access of a certain capacity. This is 
regulated in article 4 in the European Directive on services in the internal 
market (also known as the Universal Service Directive). The article 
regulates what kind of services, and what level of those services should 
be accessible at a “fixed access point”, i.e. at least a telephone line 
(Article 4, Directive 2002/22/EC).  
 
c. Finally, it is not about a situation where a content owner gives exclusive 
rights of distribution to a certain network operator and network. (PTS-
ER-2009:6, p. 8) 
 
In their 2009 publication, PTS also tries to establish whether the net is neutral 
today, or rather in 2009. Their conclusion is that there is a tiered network in some 
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ways. Different options in speed means that people who pay more get access to an 
internet with a larger band width. The capacity range that different operators have 
also mean that in areas with few competitors, the capacity might get limited solely 
on the basis of few options. Apart from this there is also a level of traffic 
discrimination from some operators to enable heavier applications to run 
smoothly. They note that prioritization of traffic is an effective tool if there is 
sufficient competition among operators so that end users can choose other 
operators if one makes prioritizations that end users do not agree with. Relating to 
their definition of what net neutrality is for service providers (and operators) this 
later scenario requires full information about what is being prioritized and at what 
cost. (PTS-ER-2009:6, p. 8) 
As for the current legal situation, PTS cites a number of different laws and in 
Sweden that currently govern what could be described as net neutrality. Most 
notably, the Electronics Communications Act (Lag (2003:389) om elektronisk 
kommunikation) that, among other things, regulate quality of service, what kind 
of information service providers are required to give, and how data packages 
under transportation are allowed to be treated. Up until 2009, PTS had had reason 
to reason to act in a question relating to net neutrality according to their definition 
of the concept. (PTS-ER-2009:6, pp. 10-11). 
PTS notes that a lot of the perspectives in the Swedish and European net 
neutrality debate are inherited from the American debate on the same issues. 
According to PTS, the main problem in the United States stem from a duopoly 
(where two corporations hold large parts of the market) situation in the access 
network, i.e. the local networks between your outlet and the station that connects 
all your local wires (PTS-ER-2009:6). We will touch upon this issue later, but as a 
short briefing, this means that there is a worry that these two corporations might 
discriminate traffic that provides competition to the corporation's’ own services. 
Since there are no access regulations as in Europe, meaning no rules that say all 
service providers can compete at an equal basis on the infrastructure, there might 
be no option to choose a competitor in some American markets. (PTS-ER-2009:6, 
p. 8) 
5.1.2 The Openness Report 
 
In late 2009, PTS developed parts of the Net Neutrality Report into the Openness 
Report for the Swedish Government. In the preamble, PTS describe the report as 
an investigation on “openness on the market for electronic communications”. The 
initial request from the government was made on the 4th of June in 2009, and PTS 
were asked to investigate and analyze the following: 
 
 What openness means for the infrastructure and transmission levels, 
and especially on the Internet and service level,  
 How the question affects environments for innovation and competition 
on the market, 
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 Which aspects on the issue of openness that are of interest for 
consumers, considering present and future consumption patterns for 
electronic services, 
 How actors within the public and private areas relate to the issue,  
 The meaning of openness in regulated and unregulated conditions,  
 The meaning of openness for the possibility of securing access to 
services. 
 
Based on the analysis of the points above, the government wants PTS to 
illustrate: 
 
 What the different network operators business models mean from a 
consumer, innovation and competition perspective, 
 What criteria an Internet access should fulfill from a consumer perspective 
and how these criteria can be measured. (PTS-ER-2009:32, p. 13, my 
translation).  
 
Although net neutrality is not mentioned within the framework of the task, it is 
still one of the central issues begging attention by lawmakers and PTS does 
highlight that this is the case by basing the report on the discussions on “open 
networks and net neutrality” (PTS-ER-2009:32, p.14). The disposition of the 
report is made up of three segments which we will analyze to some extent. The 
first of these is called “Openness on the market of electronic communications” 
and focuses mainly on developing a theoretical framework. The second, chapter 
three, “The current situation regarding openness” applies the theoretical 
framework to the Swedish market. The last chapter, “Conclusions and 
recommendations” does exactly that, covers the conclusions made and put 
forward recommendations for lawmakers.  
5.1.3 The value-chain of electronic communications  
 
The main tool which PTS use to distinguish between different parts of the 
electronic communications market is the different levels of the value-chain of 
electronic communications. It is a matter of trying to establish where different 
actors operate and under what conditions the market functions at each level. It is, 
of course a simplification, since many of the levels have levels within themselves, 
not least of all the IP and transmission levels. The levels are important for our 
discussions since one of the concerns going into this topic is that different actors 
talk about different aspects of regulations when referring to net neutrality. Being 
aware of how the levels differ from each other is a key aspect of understanding 
the debate, if that concern holds true.  
The five different levels are: the natural resources level, the infrastructure 
level, the transmission level, the IP level, and the service and content level, 
arranged from the least to the most refined product level. The first two are 
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generally not a consideration when dealing with net neutrality as they deal with 
resources such as radio waves, canalization (digging physical structures to put 
cables and fibers in), antennas, and black fiber and copper fiber allocation and 
disbursement among other things. (PTS-ER-2009:32, p. 20-21) 
The other three are of much greater significance for net neutrality. So, what 
are the differences between the three top levels? The distinction that PTS draws is 
the transmission level (or capacity and transmission level) is the sending, 
transporting and receiving of the electronic signals that make up the information 
(as in 1’s and 0’s) in the network. The physical entities are the transmitters and 
receivers, and the value creating mechanism is the trade with capacity in the 
networks as well as routing of traffic. (PTS-ER-2009:32, p. 21-22) 
The IP level is the level at which Internet operators can give customers 
Internet access. This is the mesh of addresses and locations on which all content is 
built, and where we find a large portion of the actors in the parts of the net 
neutrality debate dealing with open networks, and practices of internet operators, 
specifically actors that are in general opposed to the general definition of net 
neutrality. The physical structures on the level are routers that users themselves 
connect to, and which then connects to the transmission network. (PTS-ER-
2009:32, p. 22) 
Finally, the content and service level is the level at which you find all the 
content of the Internet. Websites, servers and user interactions are visible here. 
Since this is the only visible level for people who are not especially tech savvy, it 
is also the level of abstraction most readily available in the debate. The actors 
found here are those that generally are in favor of net neutrality regulations, 
according the standard definition of net neutrality. It is also, market share wise, 
the most value creating level of the internet since almost every single application 
you may find online is created and distributed here. (PTS-ER-2009:32, p. 22)  
5.2 The FCC perspective  
The Federal Communications Commission consists of an array of different offices 
and bureaus and from an outside perspective, it is more than a handful to start to 
understand. It is led by five commissioners where each can hold different views 
on a matter, so it does create a more diversified perspective on certain 
controversial issues. In this section we will briefly look at three separate 
regulations from the FCC, where the two earliest iterations have each been struck 
down by courts, which in turn has developed the need for new regulations.  
5.2.1 Regulation in 2005 
In 2005 the commission issued its first policy statement on net neutrality (FCC 
05-151), although the words net neutrality are never actually mentioned in the 
statement. The policy statements did make it to court in Comcast Corp. v. FCC 
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where the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia ruled against the FCC 
policy statements legal standing versus Comcast’s attempts to discriminate peer-
to-peer traffic. This eventually led to the FCC adopting its new rules in 2010. The 
original statements are as follows:  
 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.  
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to 
the needs of law enforcement.  
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the 
network. 
 To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the 
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are 
entitled to competition among network providers, application and 
service providers, and content providers. (FCC 05-151) 
 
The 2005 policy statement describes the rights of the receivers and not the 
obligations of the providers, something that differs from later regulations. Talking 
about the rights of the receivers, or consumers, there are no technological 
loopholes that create uncertainty for the actors in the market. The statement does 
give end users, or consumers, the right to access and run whatever legal 
application they wish, but they say nothing on what quality that access be, thereby 
enabling throttling and other forms of bandwidth management. That is to say, with 
the 2005 statements, consumers got to access content, but the quality of the access 
was not determined, so in theory providers could discriminate traffic, something 
that Comcast did and later won court approval for.  
The fourth point is not represented by one of the later rules and covers how the 
market for internet access ought to look. The statement goes pretty far in its 
demand for competition, saying that providers, application and service providers, 
and content providers all need to have competition and alternatives for the 
consumers.  
5.2.2 Regulation in 2010 
 
In 2010 the FCC adopted three “basic rules”, “grounded in broadly accepted 
Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions” (FCC 10-201). The previous 
iteration had been called a “statement”, so reformulating the ideas into rules was 
an attempt to improve the legal standing of the recommendations. While these 
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rules do not either explicitly mention “net neutrality”, it is what the ruling is 
trying to deal with. The rules were as follows:  
 
a. “Transparency: Fixed and mobile broadband providers must disclose 
the network management practices, performance characteristics, and 
terms and conditions of their broadband services; 
 
b. No blocking: Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband 
providers may not block lawful websites, or block applications that 
compete with their voice or video telephony services; and 
 
c. No unreasonable discrimination: Fixed broadband providers may not 
unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic.” 
(FCC 10-210) 
 
One thing worth noting is that neither rule include wireless broadband access 
that does not originate from a fixed or mobile connection in the first place. Since 
it is not uncommon that wireless internet access is available in, among others, 
public areas, it creates an interesting loophole. Where the definitions from PTS 
was based on receivers and providers, the FCC only regulate the providers. This 
creates a situation where users cannot demand anything for themselves, but only 
demand that providers fulfill their end of the bargain. It makes the regulation 
hollow and unable to adapt to new innovations. 
The first point of the ruling is roughly similar to the last point in PTS’ 
definition, namely that ISP’s need to inform about or disclose how they manage 
network capacity and access, and what the terms and conditions of the service is. 
The second rule creates different rules for fixed broadband providers and 
mobile providers that might cause some problems deciphering it. Fixed broadband 
providers cannot block “lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful 
devices”, meaning that as long as the content, whatever it may contain, is lawful, a 
fixed broadband provider cannot block it. The mobile broadband provider 
however, only need to avoid blocking “lawful websites, or block applications that 
compete with their voice or video telephony services”, leaving out an option to 
block “services” or maybe even “non-harmful devices” that connect to the mobile 
networks.  
The third rule only applies to fixed broadband providers, stating that they may 
not “unreasonably discriminate” network traffic. What is reasonable is of course 
up to distinguish by the providers themselves, and eventually by a court, if the 
FCC decide to act on that rule. Mobile broadband providers are completely 
exempt from this rule and may freely allocate their traffic priorities as they please.  
5.2.3 Regulation in 2015 
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In 2014 (Fung 2014) the FCC guidelines from 2010 were subject to a court 
decision that declared them invalid. As a response, the FCC adopted new rules in 
February of 2015 and took a distinctly new approach from the previous 
regulations. The new guidelines are so called “bright line” rules, meaning that 
they give very little room for interpretation of the rules. They are also a huge step 
towards the internet activist and content provider perspective on net neutrality, 
differing from previous regulations made by the FCC. The bright line rules are as 
follows:  
 
 No Blocking: broadband providers may not block access to legal 
content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices. 
 No Throttling: broadband providers may not impair or degrade lawful 
Internet traffic on the basis of content, applications, services, or non-
harmful devices. 
 No Paid Prioritization: broadband providers may not favor some lawful 
Internet traffic over other lawful traffic in exchange for consideration 
of any kind—in other words, no "fast lanes." This rule also bans ISPs 
from prioritizing content and services of their affiliates. (FCC 15-24) 
 
The new rules have been celebrated by some as a win for “true” net neutrality, 
and we will deal later with why that might be a problematic concept as well, while 
others have berated it for being not far enough, or way too far reaching. Barbara 
van Schewick, a Stanford law professor, gives five reasons why she thinks it does 
not go far enough in an article in the MIT Technology Review:  
 
 First, the anti-throttling regulation does not clarify exactly what is 
prohibited (should it cover specific applications or classes of 
applications?),  
 Second, it is unclear how it affects zero-rating deals from broadband 
providers where users get access to certain sites for “free” while other 
sites cost money or count towards a limited amount of traffic;  
 Third, she thinks that the exemption the FCC gives broadband 
providers when it comes to “network management”, that is adjusting 
prioritization of traffic to make sure that the internet does not get 
clogged in times of heavy use, might be misused; 
 Fourth, the FCC should clarify what is meant by discouraging the use 
of “practices related to interconnectivity” to circumvent the net 
neutrality regulations, as this is something that is done today in a 
number of different arrangements.  
 Fifth, van Schewick argues that the new rules do not effectively deal 
with how to monitor internet traffic for violations. The method of 
monitoring through transparency reports is a previously tested method 
that has been shown to be too slow for regulators to keep up with the 
practices of providers. She mentions that one method would be user 
reports of abnormalities through FCC applications.  (Anders 2015) 
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Brent Skorup, a research fellow of the Mercatus Centre at George Mason 
University, criticized the new rules by saying that net neutrality is not neutral, and 
that rules as applied by the FCC remove the ability to create more innovations 
from the private sector has they are not allowed to compete with certain tools 
anymore. He claims that this is a step backwards to a command-and-control 
economy, implying that this is something very negative, where the state controls 
exactly what is and is not allowed on the market. (Skorup 2015) 
While these two comments are far from the only ones, it is hard to tell what 
the regulation will actually do to the market, and as the rules were to be 
implemented on June 12 2015, they will not have been implemented long enough 
for any report to come out of either the FCC or any actor on how the rules apply.  
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6 Analysis 
In this section we will look at the four modalities of regulations in the New 
Chicago School theory. We will take them in turn, and see how each constrain has 
acted on the net neutrality debate. This will be tied together in the conclusion of 
the thesis, in chapter 7.  
6.1 Analysis - Law  
From the outset, net neutrality may seem like an issue that mainly consist of legal 
aspects. Either the state introduces legislation that makes sure that internet 
operators may not discriminate any single packet of information over any other 
packet of information. Or the legislative bodies make sure that internet operators 
are free to use their infrastructure in whatever way they deem necessary.  
But, the reality is of course not as simple, and therefore the debate continues, 
and there are more factors to take into consideration. So in this section we will try 
to determine how Law influences the question of network neutrality and in the 
subsequent chapters we will also investigate how the other regulators constrain 
net neutrality. We will look at a few different parts of the law, as well as 
suggestions and hypothetical alternatives that have been posed.  
6.1.1 What changes have been proposed, and how does that affect net 
neutrality?  
One of the most drastic suggestions, at least from a market and architectural 
perspective, have been the suggestion that the law should prohibit internet 
operators to treat some data differently from other data, and from selling 
prioritized positions in the networks to content holders. This, in essence, is what 
the FCC did in early 2015 with the new proposed net neutrality rules.  
According to Lessig, this is not the law affecting net neutrality directly, but 
rather the law setting up limitations for the architecture and market, thereby 
regulating the issue indirectly. As the architecture is the code and the 
infrastructure that make up the internet, any rule that prohibits certain treatment of 
data is a regulation of the architecture to get the desired effect in the issue. The 
prohibition on paid prioritization is also a market regulation where a specific 
segment of the market - i.e. prioritization payments - is in effect completely 
removed. The price mechanism stops being a factor in that segment, removing the 
markets ability to regulate there. The proposed regulation is indirect and it will be 
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self-executionary, it is objectively ex post and since we do not yet know the 
punishment for breaking the rules we cannot tell wither it subjectively will be ex 
post or ex ante.  
The same type of legislation has also been proposed in the European Union, 
most prominently by the European Commission in 2013 (European Commission 
1). The Commission led by Jean-Claude Juncker, together with the European 
Parliament and the European Council - the so called trialogue, has put forward a 
suggestion on banning paid prioritization on the open internet (European 
Commission 2). This has been critized by some as creating a loop hole in the net 
neutrality as “open internet” does not include an area called “specialized 
services”. With specialized services not a part of net neutrality, according to 
critics, ISPs may start selling packaged deals not labeled as “the internet” but are 
instead a “specialized service”, and thereby they escape the demand for net 
neutrality. In such a case, it would probably make the regulation subjectively ex 
post as ISPs would presume that specialized services can be customized according 
to their best interest. Determining what exactly makes up a specialized service 
will either have to be clarified by legislators, or most likely, by courts. (Moody 
2015) 
The previous instances of FCC regulations, as described in the background, 
were a lot vaguer and did not explicitly mention net neutrality as their aim or 
intent. The 2010 rules differentiated between different types of connections, 
where fixed broadband connections, mobile broadband connections and wireless 
broadband connections had different rules applied to them. This is a regulation of 
the protocols of the internet, or rather of communications protocols, and we will 
deal more with that in the analysis of architecture.  
6.1.2 Are there other kinds of legislation that affects net neutrality?  
 
Another model that exists in some place, although it is not always necessarily 
enforced by law, is the open access model where the transportation layer of the 
internet either has a (usually) state monopoly actor, or there has been either a 
national law, or local rules that all actors, last mile ISPs, should have equal access 
to the underlying infrastructure so that consumers will have a larger and more 
competitive selection to choose from. In this way the law removes competition 
form the transportation layer, thereby enforcing, at least to a certain extent, a kind 
of net neutrality on that specific layer. This regulation works indirectly through 
changing the architecture and the market in different ways. Through architecture it 
makes it regulate access ex ante, both objectively and subjectively. Through 
markets, it increases the chance of competition in the infrastructure, thereby 
making prices fall as actors have to compete on both prices and service. It will 
make prices regulate transmissions objectively ex post, and subjectively ex ante as 
it will not serve an ISPs market share to challenge the regulation.  
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It is a different tool than not allowing blocking or paid prioritization as it only 
regulates access to the underlying infrastructure for top level ISPs, not for the 
services or competition that the ISPs have on the top layers.  
The opposite application of law, a situation where ISPs can freely create 
different access solutions and regimes, would perhaps lead to a larger variety in 
different forms of connections, and the emergence of what some have dubbed the 
cable-TV-internet. This is a situation where consumers pay for the content that 
they actually access, maybe with a few “free” sites that can be used without 
additional charges. In these cases, the regulation of law would be applied to 
making sure that people do not create schemes to break the contracts that they 
have gone into with the ISPs.  
Furthermore, some copyright holders and security organizations have called 
for an internet where ISPs or the government checks all packages of information 
for what they contain to determine, for example, if it is something that violates 
copyright and should be charged extra, or if it for some reason contains something 
else illicit. The consequences to net neutrality in those cases would be that the law 
would discriminate every single package of information based on what it contains, 
creating an internet that is far from neutral. (Cleveson 2014) 
This regulation would be executed when someone enters the internet. 
Depending on if the filter would block or just identify and then charge for the 
copyright violation, it would be either objectively and subjectively ex ante 
(blocking) or objectively ex ante and subjectively ex post (charging). In both 
cases it would be a direct regulation on the issue, copyright infringement, but an 
indirect regulation on net neutrality. It is also sure to create tensions between all 
the different constraints.  
6.2 Analysis - Markets  
While markets have been analyzed for decades, or even centuries, often it has 
been within the field of economics. As an abstract concept, philosophers have also 
dealt with how it affects our society (or to what extent it should be considered an 
integral part of society). Here we will look at how markets act as a modality of 
regulation. How do markets constrain net neutrality? 
According to Lessig, in the most basic sense, markets constrain purely on the 
logic of supply and demand, as this is what sets the price. Objectively, price is 
only a transaction cost, based on the supply and demand on the market. With 
completely rational actors, it should make it a fairly predictable modality to 
analyze, however, that does not seem to be the case. Because, subjectively, even 
the market actors may act irrationally. Tim Wu argues this point in his 2003 
introduction to the concept of net neutrality: 
“But might network neutrality be accomplished without any regulation at all? Basic 
economic theory suggests that operators have a long-term interest coincident with the 
public: both should want a neutral platform that supports the emergence of the very best 
applications. However the evidence suggests the operators may have paid less attention to 
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their long-term interests than might be ideal. A 2002 survey of operator practices 
conducted for this paper suggests a tendency to favor short-term results.” (Wu 2003) 
6.2.1 Have things changed since 2003?  
First, let us identify who actually controls supply and demand. On the supply side 
of net neutrality, we have the internet service providers, divided into two sub 
groups, backbone providers and last mile providers. The supply in this case, is 
bandwidth and access to the internet. With backbone providers, we mean internet 
service providers that own and operate the fundamental infrastructure, level two 
and three of PTS’s defined tiers. With last mile providers we mean the internet 
service providers that deal directly with users by transporting information from 
the units the users operate, to the infrastructure that can connect them to 
everywhere else.  
On the demand side of the market are the users and creators that provide the 
internet with its substance, the content. It can be in the form of culture, or email, 
or storage, or other forms of services. These are the actors that need and want 
access to the internet to be able to do everything else they want to do. The demand 
side is often characterized as small creators or normal internet users, but also 
includes tech giants such as Google, Netflix, Apple and many others that require 
the internet to deliver their respective products.  
6.2.2 Misplaced equilibrium 
 
Previously, we looked at the case of Telia proposing to block access to Skype in 
2012. Telia was facing what they perceived to be a problem: Customers were 
using their mobile internet access, provided and purchased by and from Telia, to 
call friends and family using Skype. Since Telia is also a telecommunications 
operator, coming out of the telephone industry, and because the internet access 
was included in the consumer's’ telephone plan, they reasoned that they were 
subsidizing competing products on their network. This was not the first instance 
of telecom operators wanting to block VoIP services like Skype. Already in early 
2011, 3 (owned by Hi3G), was quoted, in an article about blocking Skype, Viber 
and Tango-like services, as saying: “We consider this a breach against the demand 
for “fair use” that customers are required to follow. We think that these types of 
services are like hot wiring the electric grid” (Brohult 2011, my translation). 3 has 
later denied that they made this statement, and remained reserved during the 2012 
discussion on blocking. (Karlsten 2012) 
To some extent this is question of technologies, or even architecture in the 
sense that this thesis covers, but first and foremost it is a market constraint. 
Markets constrain through the price mechanism. In this case the supply is 
bandwidth to VoIP services. And the demand is consumers wanting access to 
VoIP. However, the supplier does not agree with the current pricing equation and 
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decides to remove the ability to connect to certain services unless a price floor is 
met, i.e. paying a premium price. One of the reasons why Telia is acting this way 
is that data transactions also carry a cost. Relative to the telephone networks and 
wireless services, data traffic is much more cost intense for the ISP. It therefore 
seems rational for them to react this way when costumers are using a costly (from 
the perspective of Telia and other ISPs) form of communication to compete with a 
cheap form of communication, all while the ISP are supplying both. What we end 
up with is that the constraint implemented in this example is a supplier who is 
unwilling to accept the price it has already set for a service due to a perceived 
violation of “fair use”.  
As we also described previously, Telia decided to go back on their plans to 
implement a blocking of Skype, claiming that it was “too complicated” (Zirn 
2012). The ban first tried via Telia’s Spanish subsidiary Yoigo turned out 
unsuccessful. However, Telia also raised their prices by a fairly substantial margin 
to cover the perceived losses. They therefore, again, changed the balance of the 
market to find a new equilibrium.  
Telias blocking of Skype is party a case of the market indirectly regulating 
price through the use of architecture, as Telia is the controller of both in this case. 
The blocking is executed at all times, and does not require enabling by any other 
action. It regulates objectively and subjectively ex ante, as it uses architecture to 
change the price equilibrium. We also learned that Telia took a large hit in the 
public debate as the public opinion (norms) did not agree with the decision, so 
Telia had to take their decision back. This is a very interesting evidence of 
constraints clashing. With changing the price however, they again regulated, but 
this time with an execution that requires agency (as in you need to sign up for the 
service), but still objectively and subjectively ex ante. 
 
6.2.3 Manipulation of supply 
 
In the case with Netflix and Comcast, and the negotiations that took place 
between them in 2013 and 2014, the problem is slightly different. When Telia 
wanted to block Skype, VoIP was one of the most voluminous uses of bandwidth 
in mobile broadband. On normal connections, fiber broadband that is, illegal file 
sharing was what took up a large share of internet traffic. At one point, The Pirate 
Bay, a famous website for finding torrents, was responsible for about 40% of the 
total internet traffic (BBC 2013). In the September of 2013, a study claimed that 
about 24% of the internet traffic was made up of piracy (Sankin 2013). In 2014, it 
was estimated that Netflix stood for about 34 percent of the US internet traffic at 
peak hours, having pretty much taken the place of The Pirate Bay as the 
quantitatively largest source of online media consumption in the world. 
(Fitzgerald 2014) 
This is the background to why ISPs such as Comcast and Verizon wanted so 
called interconnectivity agreements with Netflix. They reasoned that since Netflix 
  36 
took up such a large swath of internet traffic, there was reason to settle an 
agreement. As with the Telia example, we have an ISP that has misjudged how 
consumers want to use the data traffic they have bought. And data traffic also 
carry costs for the ISP. So if Comcast has planned for an average consumption of 
1 Gb per month, but instead the consumer uses up 50Gb on the same connection, 
it is an unwelcome situation and the ISP needs to compensate in some way.  
The interconnectivity agreements would solve the problem by doing two 
things: First, Netflix (and others who take up a large proportion of traffic, like 
Google with Youtube) would have to pay an fee to the ISPs and thereby carry the 
increased cost for the ISP of increased traffic and, secondly, if they payed, they 
would be able to secure good service from the ISP by setting up a stronger link 
between the servers hosting the content, and the network by which it is later 
distributed. These are the interconnectivity agreements. And as Image 2 (Image 2: 
Netflix 1) below shows, it had tremendous impact on quality of delivery.  
 
 
 
What the graph shows is that in early 2014, a deal was struck between Netflix and 
Comcast, making the Netflix speed on Comcast networks shoot up. In mid-2014, 
the same deal was struck with AT&T, Verizon and Time Warner Cable. 
It is, however, noteworthy to see that before these deals were struck, the speed 
of delivery for Netflix dropped on each of these networks. From this we can 
gather two things, as it relates to the constraint of the market.  
First, the ISPs appears to have been manipulating supply to some users of the 
internet in order to pressure them in negotiations on paying extra costs: It is 
possible to manipulate supply to get the price you want. And secondly, quality of 
service is important enough for content providers, the demand side of the 
equation, to be willing to pay for that possibility of improved services. We have a 
manipulation of supply in order to get a more desired price.  
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The regulation of manipulating supply is again the market indirectly 
regulating price by regulating architecture (again, since the ISP controls both). It 
does so by agency, since they do not have to, they just want to, and they do it 
objectively and subjectively ex ante, as in it goes down right away. It has also 
clashed severely with the regulation of norms, and is one of the reasons why the 
FCC ruling from 2015 is so much harsher than previous rulings.  
The regulation of interconnectivity agreements is the market changing the 
price by letting the content distributors take the costs. It does this objectively ex 
post, since if the bills do not get payed, law will intervene. Subjectively, it 
regulates ex ante, as content distributors want good service and therefore will not 
argue once the deal is struck. It is not clear how the interconnectivity agreements 
will continue, so there is no indication of a clash yet.  
6.2.4 Content creators are also market actors 
It is worth noting that in the two examples above, the content creators, Skype and 
Netflix (and of course many others) are also market actors that use price as 
regulator. Up until this point, Skype has not begun charging for its general 
service, but they have introduced the ability to pay to connect to landlines and 
normal phone services. Since most attempts to regulate access to Skype have 
failed, there has been no real need for them to change their pricing scheme in a 
mayor way.  
As for Netflix, they have also retained the same pricing model as previously, 
but have a tiered system depending on the quality and number of screens you want 
to access the service with. Netflix has not increased prices for consumers based on 
the interconnectivity agreements, but time is to tell whether that will happen 
eventually, or if prices would have been lower without the agreements anyhow.   
6.3 Analysis - Norms 
The constraint Norms described by Lessig is not vague or hard to define, even 
though that would be a general impression that most will have of norms. Within 
this context it is a force by which the community, be it one or many, sanctions a 
breach of something that the community deems correct. Identifying what norms 
are in place and how they are acted upon is a whole different matter.  
Community itself takes many different forms. It can be the citizens of a nation 
state in general, or just your village, or your subgroup on an online forum, or even 
the fan base that you are a part of. Each community has different rules that are 
enforced by the community to some extent. In some communities it is a palpable 
rule book (like in sports), and in some the rules are that there are no rules, and you 
will instead be chastised if you try to enforce other values or rules on that 
community.  
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So, when discussing the constraint of norms, as defined by Lessig, we must 
also identify which communities are relevant for the discussion. We must then 
find what norms these communities enforce on each other and on others. Finally, 
we must describe how these norms affect the question of net neutrality. 
6.3.1 What communities are active in the debate on net neutrality, 
and how do they act?  
It might be necessary to state that the public debate does not make up the entire 
social norm that constrain net neutrality. A lot of discussion goes on in the 
comment sections on Facebook, but is generally, and rightly so, hard to track 
down. The public debate is therefore where we will have to make our effort to 
find normative behavior. 
6.3.2 The proponents - activists 
The group most active in enforcing some form of norms are the activists fighting 
for the “freedom of the internet”. These groups come on many different forms, 
from political parties like the Pirate Party, to hacktivist groups such as 
Anonymous, to NGOs such as the EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) and other 
more or less cohesive groupings. 
These groups are all proponents of a net neutrality where no, or at least very 
few, type of information is treated differently from any other type of information. 
On a vote in the European Parliament declaring the Parliaments wish to enforce 
net neutrality – in this case a legal protection against all forms of traffic 
discrimination – in the European Union (the vote has not led to a clear net 
neutrality position of the European Union, something which is still being 
discussed), the Swedish Pirate Party MEP Amelia Andersdotter called the result 
“a victory for the free competition, democracy and for a living culture” 
(Piratpartiet 2014). The EFF declares net neutrality “a principle that must be 
upheld to protect [the] future of our open Internet” (EFF 1). Anonymous is of 
course not a cohesive organization, so statements from them should be taken 
lightly, but various different accounts claiming to be Anonymous have 
condemned the FCC for the abolition of the previous net neutrality rules (Video 
from Anonymous 2014). However, they also celebrated the FCC’s rules from 
early 2015 (AnonHQ 2015). 
The norm that these this group is enforcing can be summarized as follows: 
“The internet should be equal for all end users”. An end user is someone who is at 
the end of the value chain of the internet, using or distributing content and 
services on the existing infrastructure. Equality for the end user means that no 
matter the service or content that you are trying to distribute or access, your 
internet service provider should treat every request with just as much bandwidth 
and with the same prioritization as every other package of information.  
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Anything interpreted as a breach of this principle is met with staunch 
opposition and calls for rallying other activist with tools such as opinion pieces, to 
comments on various internet forums such as Facebook or Reddit. Even the recent 
success of the 2015 net neutrality rules from the FCC are treated with skepticism 
from some activist groups that are still raising money. (Free Press 1)  
After the 2010 FCC rules were struck down in early 2014 (Fung 2014), the 
authority decided to have an open call for opinions on a new net neutrality 
regulation (FCC 1). The then newly started HBO Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver had only run four episodes when they decided to cover the net neutrality 
issue. With the long form segments on the show, John Oliver could use 13 
minutes to explain a view of net neutrality very much in line with what internet 
activists have argued. In the end of the segment, with the words “Turn on Caps 
Lock and fly, fly my pretties”, Oliver called for his viewers to submit their own 
comments to the FCC, with the expressed purpose of getting the authority to 
implement strong net neutrality rules. Three days later, the FCC comment system 
had crashed due to 45 000 public comments (Brody 2015). In September, the call 
for public opinions ended, and a total of 3.7 million comments had been made, 
vastly surpassing any previous call. An analysis from the Sunlight Foundation on 
the first 800 000 comments found that about one percent of them were opposed to 
net neutrality. (Lannon - Pendleton 2014 and Hu 2014) 
The social sanctions of the norm were to show policy makers that people cared 
about net neutrality, and to push more people into caring about it. That sanction 
must be said to have worked. As regulations by norm, these suggestions require 
agency to actually constrain actions. Objectively and subjectively they regulate ex 
post, at least if considering the sanction activism. While norms usually are not 
subject to restrictions by other constraints, norms do act as a barrier for the other 
constraints in this subject, making certain lines of action very difficult to uphold, 
as seen with the Telia and Comcast examples. In the end, this normative sanction 
coincided with a legal process, pushing a certain legal alternative to be the most 
viable solution to the problem.  
6.3.3 The opposition - Pro ISP advocates 
An arguably less successful norm has been that of, a bit bluntly put, “let business 
do what business does”. In this line of arguing, a neutral net is a problem as it 
does not let ISPs compete by requiring actors who put pressure on the network’s 
capacity to pay extra for the extra effort in optimizing delivery. The practice of 
discriminating or demanding those forms of payment was covered both in the 
background and will also be covered in the analysis of how markets constrain net 
neutrality. But in this section it is about the normative force this perspective has 
had.  
Much like the previously mentioned norm of “freedom of the internet”, the 
enforcement of the norm has taken place in opinion texts and public debates. 
However, this side has had much less success in getting crowds on their side, 
therefore limiting the possibility to actually sanction violations of the norm. In 
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Forbes, Josh Steimle wondered if he was the only techie opposed to net neutrality 
(Steimle 2014). The main advocacy group for the ISPs, the NCTA - the National 
Cable and Telecommunications Association, want an “open internet”, saying that 
regulation would stifle innovation (NCTA 1). And former FCC chairman Michael 
K. Powell also argued that the internet is not so sick that it needs an injection of 
regulation (Powell 2014). 
That being said, this group has not had the same success as the pro-net 
neutrality groups have had, and it is hard to properly evaluate in what way they 
have tried to implement social sanctions in other ways. Some sanctions, such as 
Comcast’s decrease in delivery of bandwidth during negotiations with Netflix 
could probably be interpreted as a social sanction, but fits better both as a market 
mechanism to some extent, or maybe as an evidence of the constraint of 
architecture.  
In the same ways as the other norm regulation, the opposition requires agency 
to enforce their, admittedly not very powerful, regulation. Their regulation is also 
both objectively and subjectively ex post, and it has not seen any conflict with 
other constraints, unless you count the activists that also use norms.  
6.4 Analysis - Architechture 
Besides the law, the point that Lessig really wants to make with his theory is 
showing and explaining how architecture acts as a regulator. How architecture 
constrains. In the Handbook on the Politics of Regulation, the New Chicago 
School Theory is dealt with under a chapter specifically on internet regulation 
(Murray 2011, p 272). The reason for this is that it is a theory that, more than 
others, highlight how to view architecture in general and the internet specifically, 
in terms of regulation. One aspect to why Lessig focuses so much on architecture, 
and why the theory appears to be applied internet regulation, is that code can 
regulate in many different ways.  
Code is, literally, the building blocks of the internet. And it is the building 
material which a lot of our modern world runs on. Since net neutrality is a 
question with a strong focus on technology and the internet in general, it is safe to 
say that architecture, i.e. code, plays a major role in how it is being regulated. It is 
therefore also difficult to describe or even identify every kind of architectural 
regulation. I will look at two types of architectural regulation in net neutrality: 
First and most importantly, how protocols regulate (and work). Secondly, how the 
layers regulate.  
6.4.1 Protocols regulate 
Protocols are “the blueprints that enable technical interoperability among 
heterogeneous technology products” (Denardis 2009, p. 6). This means that 
protocols dictate how information (“binary streams” (Ibid.) of 0’s and 1’s) are to 
  41 
be interpreted in different circumstances so that different parts of the internet and 
different technologies can communicate with each other. Much like blueprints in 
real life describe how different systems fit together, or how municipal planning 
maps say how the infrastructure of the city should work and develop, protocols 
say what should go where and how it should be interpreted within an electronic 
network. Some famous protocols that Denardis mentions are MP3, Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth and HTTP. 
Since the net neutrality debate is a discussion on whether all information 
should be treated equally on the internet or if internet operators are allowed to 
prioritize certain information above others, protocols regulate everything within 
the net neutrality debate. 
Take for example IP, Internet Protocol, which is what the addresses online. An 
IP address is an identifying sequence of numbers that gives information about 
who the sender or receiver of a data package is. Knowing this allows someone to 
take specific actions against known IP-addresses, be it slowing down traffic they 
can control, or send an email. “If IP is the least common denominator for 
communicating over the Internet, and the one protocol used in every instance of 
Internet connectivity, one can envision that this protocol would be relevant to a 
number of concerns and of interest to those seeking greater control of the 
Internet” (Denardis 2009, p. 9) 
Denardis notes, much like Lessig, that protocols and technology have political 
impact. She says that protocols have embedded values, reflecting the 
“socioeconomic and political interests” (2009, p. 10) of those who wrote the code. 
In our discussion this means that protocols, to the extent that they can change or 
new ones can be introduced, are at the mercy also of those who can control the 
flow of data.  
It is, however, difficult to determine exactly how they will affect net neutrality 
on aggregate. Some protocols work towards allowing free flow of information on 
the network, some are more restrictive, some are filtering and some are 
circumventing filters. 
So protocols regulate net neutrality without the need for agency, it is a self-
executionary regulation, unless you have the ability implement new protocols but 
that is not likely. Protocols also regulate objectively and subjectively ex ante. As 
for the relation to other regulations protocols pretty much set the scene for how 
the other regulations may act on the internet. And finally, there are definitely 
clashes between regulation by the architecture protocol and other modalities of 
regulation. Since protocols form the basis for most other regulation online, it has a 
big impact on the plausibility or effectiveness of other modalities of regulation.  
6.4.2 Layers regulate  
In architectural terms, the layers of the internet is probably what most people 
would associate most acutely with “normal” architecture. The layers of the 
internet are defined somewhat differently by different actors. In the background, 
we learned that PTS in Sweden defines five different layers in the value chain of 
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the internet. Denardis identifies four different layers, based on her theory of 
protocols. Barbara van Schewick also uses a similar layout as Denardis, 
identifying four different layers (van Schewick 2012, p. 84). The main difference 
is that PTS adds a natural resources level that does not really require protocols or 
software, since it is the physical cables that the information later travels through. 
So the terminology “value chain of the internet” and “the internet” encompasses a 
few different things. The OSI model of the internet, that was also mentioned 
previously, divides the internet up in seven layers of communications functions.  
Either way, different actors operate on the different layers on the internet. The 
top layers are in a dependent relationship to the lower layers as they need access 
to the internet and the lower levels transport the bits, and the lower layers are only 
dependent on the top layers as customers that buy bandwidth.  
Therefore, as some internet operators also operate on different layers at the 
same time, the ownership and control of different layers at the same time would 
make it possible for an internet operator to transport its own data with higher 
quality than competitor that do not have the same ability, as they only operate on 
one layer. This has been a fear in much of the net neutrality debate, that operators 
would abuse this position, but it appears not to be such a big problem at the time 
of writing this text. 
Layers also regulate in that if you are working on the top layers, they you are 
bound by the rules set on the lower layers. In the original architecture of the 
internet, and mostly also today, those rules are often very loose, neutral, and allow 
for a large variety of applications. But it is also easy to imagine that not all 
outcomes are possible due to certain preferences manifesting in the code. In a very 
real sense therefore, all consecutive layers are bound by how the lower layers 
Image 3: An OSI-model by Coplex. (Coplex 1)  
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have been structured, what types of cables are laid out, whether IPv4 addresses 
are available or if the layer above is actually made to run IPv6 as well. 
As with protocols, layers are self-executionary. Sure, you have a sort of 
agency that additional regulation in the form of actually manipulating access and 
abusing ownership of different layers may regulate further, but from the outset, 
layers are there and will regulate. Also, as with protocols, they regulate both 
objectively and subjectively ex ante, and since they are another fundamental in 
internet politics, they frame the arena on which the other regulations may work.  
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7 Conclusions 
With an increasing reliance on the internet in our daily lives, it becomes 
increasingly important to understand how the internet is governed, and what stake 
public and private institutions respectively have in that arena. One of many issues 
emerging from that discussion has been that of network neutrality.  
If you would take a snapshot of all that is written about net neutrality online, 
you would mostly end up with the description that net neutrality is about internet 
Service Providers being legally mandated to never treat any package of 
information differently from any other packet of information. That, from the 
perspective of the end user, the traffic is treated in a neutral manner.  
In this thesis, we have studied how different types of constraints regulate net 
neutrality, or the discrimination and customization of internet traffic. These 
constraints are a part of the New Chicago School theory, developed by professor 
Lawrence Lessig. Law, Markets, Norms and Architecture all act as modalities of 
regulation and constrain the behavior and actions of a thing. In this case, the thing 
is net neutrality.  
7.1 The constraints 
We have constructed an analytical tool based on Lessig’s theory, where we look at 
whether the different constraints need agency or are self-executionary, whether 
they regulate ex post or ex ante, objectively or subjectively, whether they are used 
directly or indirectly, or maybe even if they have counter acted each other in any 
way. 
Having established the theory and analytical tool, we have managed to 
categorize certain aspects of the net neutrality issues. We can now say that more 
than any other regulation, architecture forms the very foundation on which all 
other regulations act and must relate to when it comes to net neutrality. Both 
protocols and layers create distinct regulation, objectively ex ante, and any other 
regulation has to take architecture into account. It is also hard to identify in what 
direction architecture regulates, where it wants to go, as it is such a fundamental 
aspect of net neutrality. Saying that the internet was always free and should 
remain so does not give us a direction.  
We have also established that law is the regulation where we can most clearly 
see how it may be used, and it is where a large portion of the debate has taken 
place. The main discussion regarding law is whether it can be mandated in 
legislation that ISPs should not be allowed to discriminate any form of data 
transfer in relation to any other form of data transfer. Such a regulation would not 
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only act on architecture and protocols to make sure that it acts in certain ways, but 
would also remove a segment of the market where ISPs would no longer be 
allowed to compete. Such a regulation has now been introduced in the United 
States, and there are political suggestions for it also in the European Union. The 
regulation is indirect, objectively ex post and most likely subjectively ex ante. 
And it will interfere a lot with both markets and architecture. Other aspects of law 
would be less harsh, by perhaps imposing an open access model that will increase 
competition among the ISPs and improving their practices that way. 
We have learned that even if it might not seem like it at first, internet activists 
are many and they are very interested in net neutrality. Not only were they spurred 
by an immensely popular TV-show to write into the FCC in their call for 
comments, they have also affected that TV-show in the first place, and it 
converged with the open call. 3.7 million comments later, the FCC went for a 
regulation that was very different from previous attempts, and it was in line with 
the activist norms on net neutrality. While the norm is not the harshest regulation, 
enough people can turn it to a very effective modality. It regulates ex post, and it 
requires an enormous amount of agency, but once enabled, it constricts the 
possibilities for the other modalities in a very tangible way.  
Finally, we have learned that markets have been the area where most 
regulation has taken place up until this point, and where the issues have really 
come to light. While it only regulates based on the price mechanism, we have seen 
that the price mechanism is a lot more complex than one might first expect. When 
Telia tried to block Skype, and when Comcast tried to strike a deal with Netflix, 
the market indirectly regulated through architecture to adjust a price equilibrium 
what had spun out of hand. In the Telia case, norms even made the company have 
to step down from its policy. In the Comcast case, we have yet to see how the 
interconnectivity agreements will pan out after the new FCC regulations are in 
place.  
7.2 Evaluation and research suggestions 
Another aspect of this thesis was to develop the New Chicago School theory into 
an analytical tool that could be better used to structure and understand regulatory 
issues. From the outset, Lessig’s theory is structured around a few hypothetical 
examples, and he does not develop a tool to properly export an analysis to other 
fields of study. 
Finding a structure that could be used as an analytical tool proved to be fairly 
easy after all. Lessig develops some of his definitions in an appendix, adding the 
complexity of agency and self-execution, as well as objective and subjective 
regulations. A part of the book where he describes how indirect regulation can 
backfire was developed into the analytical tool of constraints counteracting each 
other. 
The real problems with the tool came instead when the analysis began and 
there had to be a selection of sources. Lessig, again, does not give any instructions 
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on how to develop the theory further, and since there is no previous research to 
take selection of sources from, it was a matter of identifying representative cases 
to the best of my knowledge. All of the aspects that have been analyzed in the 
thesis are relevant, and play a role in the regulation of net neutrality, but there is 
also a thousand other things that could have been looked at if the scope of the 
thesis had been bigger, and my time had been endless.  
7.2.1 Continued research 
Lessig’s theory is beneficial if you want to structure a problem of regulation and 
think of different modalities and how they affect a thing. As such, this theory is 
well worth continuing to develop and use on other areas of policy and regulation 
analysis. Most importantly because it highlights the importance of other 
modalities of regulation than law specifically.  
For other researchers, a key aspect is continuing to develop the analytical tool 
and partly fine tune it for application in more narrow areas, but also make it more 
generalized so that it can be applied to more varied areas of research.  
As for net neutrality, research has to go into evaluating how the new 
frameworks are going to work in the US, but it is also necessary to look at how 
different modalities of regulation may counteract the legal side of things.  
All in all, more effort should go into understanding the many variations of 
regulation that take place every day, outside of political assemblies and court 
rooms. If more regulators take that into account, that’s not nothing.  
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